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Abstract
We detail recent international sanctions against the Iranian economy and its
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government and rural and urban Iranian households disaggregated by income
decile are modelled using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model which
uses endogenous taxes to simulate the effects of sanctions. Results suggest that
sanctions on Iranian oil exports had a serious negative effect on the Iranian econ-
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urban households.
J.E.L. Classification Codes: F51, Q34, C68
Keywords: sanctions; oil; Iran; CGE model
This is work in progress and should not be quoted without prior approval of the authors.
Correspondence should be directed via email to Robert Waschik at robert.waschik@vu.edu.
au.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 International Sanctions and the Iranian Economy 3
2.1 Impacts of International Sanctions on Iran’s economy . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Iran’s Energy Sector under International Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Data and CGE Model 8
3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 CGE Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Counterfactual Results 13
5 Sensitivity Analysis 18
6 Conclusion 21
1 Introduction
International sanctions have become an important tool for use against a target country
to pursue various foreign policy goals. According to data from the Institute for Interna-
tional Economics (2002), there were only five countries affected by economic sanctions
in 1950s. This number increased to 47 in the 1990s. Advocates of sanctions believe
that economic pressures can be effective in altering the target country’s policies without
military intervention (Baldwin, 1985). However, others argue that sanctions on a target
country have not resulted in anticipated outcomes while imposing considerable costs on
citizens who have little influence on the behaviour of their governments (Drezner, 1999;
Elliott, 1998; Hufbauer et al., 1990; Pape, 1997).
According to Hufbauer et al. (2007), economic sanctions “mean the deliberate, gov-
ernment-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial
relations”. International economic sanctions are regarded as a less expensive alternative
to military intervention (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007). While the main goal of
economic sanctions is to interrupt a target country’s economic and diplomatic relations
in order to alter its political and military behaviour, these measures are increasingly
being employed against weaker and more dependent nations without full consideration
of their impact on the welfare of citizens in these countries, particularly vulnerable
groups of households. The literature of sanctions argues that broad economic sanctions
unintentionally damage the well-being of citizens in targeted countries, by deteriorating
the quality and access to education and public health care services and worsening their
economic conditions (Cortright et al., 2001; Drury and Li, 2006; Weiss, 1999; Weiss
et al., 1997). As a dramatic example, Pape (1998) cites evidence that suggests that
comprehensive UN sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s had devastating humanitarian
consequences, causing the deaths of as many as 567000 Iraqi children while significantly
reducing Iraq’s GDP.
There is considerable evidence that economic sanctions aimed at imposing hard-
ships on the economy of a target country can severely disrupt economic activities in
sanctioned sectors and consequently restrict economic growth in the sanctioned country
(Andreas, 2005; Neumeier and Neuenkirch, 2014; Crawford and Klotz, 1999; Dizaji and
Van Bergeijk, 2013; Hufbauer et al., 2007; Jacobson, 2008; Neumeier and Neuenkirch,
2014). Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007) note that there is “no doubt that embargoes or
restrictions on flows of goods and capital impose welfare costs on the target economy”.
While some studies have estimated the aggregate effects of sanctions on target countries,
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few if any have employed economic models to estimate the welfare losses imposed by
economic sanctions on different economic agents and households in sanctioned countries.
Over the past three decades, considerable effort has been expended by the United
States (arguably the most prominent actor on the sanctions scene) to induce the in-
ternational community to develop a sanctions policy against Iran due to concern over
attempts by Iran to develop weapons of mass destruction and humanitarian concerns.
Since 2011/2012, strict economic sanctions have been imposed by the US, the EU and
others on Iran’s economy in an attempt to discourage the government of Iran from con-
tinuing to engage in the development of a nuclear weapons capability (Abrams et al.,
2012; O’Sullivan, 2010; Schott, 2012). These recent sanctions have effectively targeted
Iranian oil exports, which make up a significant source of revenue for the government of
Iran. In this paper we seek to analyze the impact of comprehensive economic sanctions
on Iran’s economy in general, on the government of Iran and on households of differ-
ent socio-economic backgrounds, especially those from the lower and middle classes of
society. But the recent sanctions against Iran were applied over a period when the
government of Iran undertook a major reform of large domestic subsidies on heavily dis-
torted food and energy products. An examination of the recent economic performance
of Iran would conflate the effects of this significant subsidy reform with those of the
international sanctions against Iran. This problem motivates our use of a Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the effects of international sanctions,
where we generate counterfactual results which mimic as closely as possible the changes
in Iranian exports and imports of sanctioned commodities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a summary of international sanctions
against Iran, including a description and recent performance of the sectors of the Ira-
nian economy which have been most strongly affected. This information, particularly
the observed decreases in Iranian production and exports of oil since the strict US and
EU sanctions were enforced, is used to validate the performance of the CGE model in
simulating the effects of international sanctions against Iran. The dataset, production
technology and utility functions which comprise the CGE model are described in Section
3. We populate the CGE model with data on production, consumption and trade from
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), a popular CGE model used extensively in
such exercises. We augment the GTAP8 dataset with information from the Statistical
Centre of Iran (SCI) which enables us to disaggregate private demand to ten urban and
ten rural consumer groups, and to accurately allocate ownership of factors of production
between urban and rural households and the government in Iran. The latter is of fun-
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damental importance, since international sanctions primarily target Iran’s oil exports,
and the rents derived from the ownership of all capital and natural resources employed
in the production of energy products in Iran accrue to the government of Iran.
The CGE model uses endogenous trade taxes to simulate the effects of sanctions on
Iranian exports and imports of sanctioned commodities. Section 4 reports and inter-
prets quantitative estimates of the effects of economic sanctions on Iranian government
revenue and on the well-being of Iranian rural and urban households. Results suggest
that international sanctions could reduce aggregate welfare in Iran by 14-15%. But ag-
gregate results mask considerable differences in the effects of sanctions on urban and
rural households and on the government in Iran. While the lowest-income rural and
urban households could see welfare losses of 5-10%, medium- to high-income households
actually experience an improvement in welfare, with the highest-income rural households
experiencing welfare gains of 3%. But the international sanctions effectively target im-
portant sources of revenue for the government of Iran, resulting in reductions in real
government revenue of 40-50%. Simulations demonstrating the sensitivity of results to
exogenously specified parameters in the CGE model including trade elasticities and the
intersectoral mobility of capital used to produce oil in Iran are presented in Section 5,
while Section 6 concludes.
2 International Sanctions and the Iranian Economy
The Iranian economy has been exposed to ongoing political and economic sanctions by
the United States, including trade and financial sanctions since Iran’s 1979 Islamic rev-
olution. But the goals of U.S. sanctions policy against Iran have changed over time.
According to Katzman (June 2013), U.S. economic sanctions in the mid-1980s were
aimed at limiting Iran’s strategic power in the Middle East in general, and forcing Iran
to stop supporting terrorism in particular. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. sanctions have
targeted Iran’s petroleum sectors and nuclear program with the objective of weaken-
ing Iran’s economy. In the meantime, European nations refused to follow U.S. policy
to impose economic sanctions against Iran (Pollack and Takeyh, 2005). In 1996, the
U.S. Senate approved the “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act” (ILSA), prohibiting foreign
investment in any oil and gas development projects in Iran of over $40 million during
any 12-month period (Hufbauer et al., 2012). In spite of ongoing sanctions imposed by
the U.S. on economic sectors in Iran that contributed to the proliferation of sensitive
nuclear and missile programs, and despite international opposition, Iran has nonethe-
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less developed its missile and nuclear programs with major assistance from the Russian
government (Ataev, 2013).
The ILSA ran for five years and was twice renewed by the U.S. Senate, in 2001
and 2006. Over those fifteen years, the ILSA combined with other problems in the
Iranian economy including economic mismanagement to produce a considerable drop in
the growth of Iranian oil production (Schott, 2012). The European Union (EU) joined
the U.S. in imposing economic sanctions against Iran from 2006 as a result of Iran’s
contentious nuclear program. Since 2010, the EU sanctions have mainly targeted the
oil and gas, transportation and financial and insurance sectors in the Iranian economy
(Patterson, 2013). In 2010, the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 was substantially amended
and expanded into the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment
Act (CISADA), limiting the sale of gasoline, other petroleum products as well as refinery-
related equipment to Iran (Hufbauer et al., 2012; Katzman, August 2014). Since 2010,
many other countries including Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland
have adopted economic sanctions against Iran due to its nuclear ambitions.
The U.S. and the EU launched a new series of tough energy sanctions against Iran in
late 2011 and early 2012. The main objective of these sanctions was to discourage Iran
from developing its nuclear program by reducing Iran’s oil-export revenues. In early
2012, the U.S. enacted a new generation of financial sanctions against Iran’s Central
Bank, restricting Iran’s ability to use the international financial system. The new fi-
nancial sanctions posed a serious problem for the Iranian government for both non-oil
transactions as well as oil-related transactions between the Central Bank of Iran and
any foreign financial institutions (Farzanegan, 2011), successfully forcing Iran to agree
to receive payment for oil in either the national currencies of oil importing countries
or gold (Katzman, March 2012). In July 2012, the EU imposed an embargo on the
import, purchase and transport of Iranian crude oil (Katzman, June 2013). The EU
also banned imports of petrochemical products from Iran. EU financial sanctions came
into force in October 2012, banning the provision of financial communication services
with the Central Bank of Iran, except for humanitarian transactions with Iranian banks
(Farzanegan, 2013). Notably, EU sanctions also prohibited European-based insurers of
oil tankers from providing coverage for any vessels carrying Iranian crude (Van de Graaf,
2013).
Both politicians and oil-market experts initially believed that the new U.S. and EU
sanctions which targeted Iranian exports of petroleum, natural gas, oil and chemicals
would not force Iran to slow down the progress of its nuclear program since they would
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Oil exports by destination
Asia and Oil Petrol Gas
Year World Europe Pacific Africa Prod’n Prod’n Prod’n
2007 2639 847 1469 148 4030.7 1498.0 111900
2008 2574 749 1542 147 4055.7 1587.0 116300
2009 2406 568 1538 127 3557.1 1726.1 175742
2010 2583 878 1571 134 3544.0 1743.3 187357
2011 2537 741 1392 127 3576.0 1748.7 188753
2012 2102 162 1839 101 3739.8 1811.9 202431
2013 1215 128 1085 2 3575.3 1918.4 199293
Source: OPEC (various years)
Table 1: Iran – Oil Exports and Energy Production (1000b/d, except Gas,
1000000 cu m)
not significantly shrink Iran’s oil exports (Van de Graaf, 2013). But these sanctions
proved remarkably effective in curtailing Iranian oil exports, in no small part due to the
dominant position held by UK insurance companies in insuring the world’s oil tankers
(Van de Graaf (2013, p.154)). EU oil imports from Iran which had accounted for more
than a quarter of Iran’s oil exports (see Table 1) fell dramatically, and reports by the
International Energy Agency in early 2013 (International Energy Agency, 2013) and
Iran’s oil minister revealed that Iran’s oil exports fell by 40 percent from 2011 levels, and
Iran’s oil-export revenues dropped by over $40 billion in 2012 because of new sanctions.
Table 1 highlights the effectiveness of these expanded international sanctions against the
Iranian oil sector.
2.1 Impacts of International Sanctions on Iran’s economy
Before describing the general equilibrium model used to study the effects of international
sanctions on Iran’s economy, this Section provides a brief background on certain macro-
economic variables and key economic sectors of Iran’s economy, and the impacts of
international sanctions on these sectors.
After 1979, Iran endured almost two decades of revolution, war and reform as well
as international pressures which brought about considerable socio-economic disruption,
heavy military and civilian casualties, and a drop in the production and export of energy
commodities. Over the past three decades, the burden of the eight-year war, a drop in
domestic production in the 1980s and massive shortages in fuels, medicines and neces-
sities, high inflation as well as increasing speculation and a growing black market all
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combined to produce strong grounds for direct government intervention in Iran’s econ-
omy (Esfahani and Pesaran, 2009). Energy commodities and other sizable industries and
enterprises are under the control of the state, while the private sector has a negligible
authority to run small businesses (Esfahani et al., 2013).
From the beginning of 2002, the Iranian government committed itself to implement-
ing trade reforms, exchange rate unification, ratification of the law on foreign invest-
ment, the licensing of three private banks and tax reform, intended to adjust distortions
and structural imbalances. The government in Iran has since launched several market-
oriented reforms aimed at reversing the recent downward economic spiral, including the
reform of food and energy subsidies. However, international sanctions combined with
years of government mismanagement and widespread corruption have left the economy
vulnerable to very high inflation and negative growth rates (Hufbauer and Schott, 2006;
Katzman (June 2013); Plaut (2013); International Monetary Fund (2014)). For instance,
the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) reported that the inflation rate in Iran reached 35
percent in December 2013, and the economy faced an unemployment rate of around 13
percent. Devarajan and Mottaghi (2014) note that the economy of Iran has experienced
negative growth rates of -3.0 and -2.1 percent for 2012 and 2013 respectively. Since the
tightening of energy and financial sanctions against Iran in 2012, the Iranian currency
(Rial) lost more than 80% of its exchange value (Monshipouri and Dorraj, 2013). But it
is difficult to attribute the effects on macroeconomic variables like inflation and growth
rates to one policy (international sanctions) or the other (food and energy subsidy re-
form) since both occurred over the same period and both represented large economic
shocks to the Iranian economy. This problem of disentangling the effects of such policies
is well suited to CGE modelling which can isolate the effects of one set of economic
shocks in clearly specified counterfactual simulations.
2.2 Iran’s Energy Sector under International Sanctions
According to Central Bank of Iran (2010), the oil and gas sector dominated the econ-
omy of Iran, accounting for an estimated 90 percent of foreign exchange revenues and
providing 60 percent of government earnings in fiscal year 2008-2009. Iran possesses
the world’s second largest natural gas reserves and the fourth largest proven oil reserves
(International Energy Agency, 2012). Even though Iran boasts vast gas resources, the
country has been incapable of becoming a leading global gas exporter because natural
gas produced by the underdeveloped sector is mostly used to meet domestic demand.
In 2010, 59 percent of Iran’s total domestic energy consumption came from natural gas
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(U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013).
Revenue from Iran’s oil and gas sectors makes up the major share of government
revenue, so these have been a major target of the latest international economic sanc-
tions against Iran. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013), the
toughening of sanctions against Iran in 2012 resulted in a 40 percent decrease in Iran’s
oil exports, though Iran was still producing 3.5 million bpd over the period of 2012-2013,
with the unsold crude oil being stockpiled in onshore and floating storage (International
Energy Agency; International Energy Agency, 2012; 2013). Prior to 2010, Iran had
stockpiled crude oil in floating storage in order to increase profits from the world energy
market. However, since 2010 there has been a correlation between Iran’s floating oil
storage and the toughening of sanctions against Iran’s energy sector (Lee, 2004; Mann,
2013; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). According to International En-
ergy Agency (2013), estimates of Iran’s crude oil stockpile in floating storage in 2013 were
around 20-25 million barrels. Estimates also show that Iran has a total onshore stor-
age capacity of 25 million barrels, and that most of this capacity is filled (International
Energy Agency, 2013).
According to Hufbauer et al. (2012), the average welfare loss caused by U.S. sanctions
on Iran over the period 1984-2005 was around $80 million, less than one percent of
Iranian GDP over that period. But over the period of 2006-2012, international sanctions
against Iran produced an average welfare loss of $5.7 billion, equivalent to about 1 to
3 percent of Iranian GDP (Hufbauer et al., 2012). Kitous et al. (2013) used a CGE
model to simulate the effects of increasingly strict application of an embargo on Iranian
oil exports, suggesting a fall in Iranian GDP relative to baseline of 6-17% (Kitous et al.
(2013, p.17)). But both Hufbauer et al. (2012) and Kitous et al. (2013) focus on the
effects of sanctions on macroeconomic aggregates, and do not decompose the effects of
sanctions on different economic agents within Iran. To our knowledge, no study has
analyzed the economic impacts of these sanctions on separate economic agents in Iran.1
Since the primary target of international sanctions against Iran is the behaviour of the
government of Iran, and since the impact of these sanctions on needy and vulnerable
households in Iran is a source of concern, we specifically decompose the impacts of
international sanctions on the government of Iran and on 20 Iranian household types in
rural and urban areas, grouped according to income.
1Farzanegan et al., 2015 use a CGE model to decompose the effects of international sanctions against
Iran on different rural and urban households in Iran, but do not give an explicit treatment of their effect
on government revenue in Iran, arguably the most important consideration when looking at the effects
of sanctions against Iran. They also adopt an external closure through which international sanctions
result in an appreciation of the Rial.
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3 Data and CGE Model
3.1 Data
We begin with version 8 of the GTAP dataset which depicts a global general equilibrium
of production, consumption, and trade for 129 countries/regions and 57 commodities
produced using 5 primary factors of production and intermediate inputs for the year
2007, described in Narayanan et al. (2012). We aggregate GTAP regions into three
separate regions: Iran, a single aggregate of all countries/regions which apply sanctions
on trade with Iran (‘SAN’), and an aggregate rest-of-world (‘RoW’) of all remaining
regions. Given the description of international sanctions on trade with Iran in Section 2,
the aggregate region ‘SAN’ of countries applying sanctions on trade with Iran includes:
Canada, the United States, Mexico, Central America, Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, Republic of Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore,
India, Sri Lanka, the 28 EU countries, South Africa
The commodity aggregation (available from the authors on request/See the Ap-
pendix, Table A-1) is constructed to allow us to reflect multilateral sanctions as ac-
curately as possible, and to accommodate disaggregation of private consumption using
information from the Urban and Rural Household Income and Expenditure Survey from
the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) (Statistical Centre of Iran, 2005). To highlight how
the economies of Iran and the two aggregated regions differ, Table 2 reports output value
shares implied by the aggregated GTAP8 dataset. Commodities with an x-superscript
(oil, petroleum products, metals) are those where sanctions are applied on Iranian ex-
ports to ‘SAN’ countries, while commodities with an m-superscript (petroleum products,
metals, motor vehicles) are those where sanctions are applied on Iranian imports from
‘SAN’ countries. Economic activity in Iran has long been dominated by the oil sector,
and before their recent reform in 2010, large state fuel subsidies resulted in a petrol sector
which is considerably larger (as a share of the value of output) than that in other regions
(see Gharibnavaz and Waschik (2014)). As a result, the share of output accounted for
by the manufacturing and service sectors is notably smaller in Iran.
3.2 CGE Model
Since international sanctions on trade with Iran focus on oil and petrochemical products,
we adopt a specification of the demand side of the CGE model which follows that in
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Sanction Rest of
Sector Iran Countries World
Wheat and Cereal Grains 1.5 0.3 0.9
Raw Milk 1.1 0.2 0.6
Meat 1.0 0.9 2.1
Vegetable Oil 0.4 0.3 0.8
Dairy 2.1 1.0 1.4
Sugar 0.1 0.1 0.3
Other Primary Agriculture 2.2 0.9 2.5
Other Processed Agriculture 2.7 2.7 3.7
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3
Oilx 21.1 0.4 6.5
Gas 2.7 0.3 1.7
Electricity 3.5 1.8 2.7
Petrolx,m 9.3 2.5 3.6
Metal Productsx,m 6.5 10.1 9.2
Motor Vehiclesm 2.5 3.1 1.8
Manufactures 4.4 15.1 11.6
Transport 4.9 4.9 5.9
Services 34.0 55.3 44.5
Table 2: Output Value Shares from GTAP8 Dataset (2007)
other studies which focus on energy markets like the GTAP-E model.2 For each of the
18 production sectors, production technology is represented with a series of nested CES
production functions, as shown in Figure 1. The central case values for the substitution
elasticities in Figure 1 are similar to those used in Rutherford and Paltsev (2000) and
Fischer and Fox (2007). We adopt the GTAP primary factor substitution elasticities,
available from Chapter 14 in Narayanan et al. (2012), reflected on the right side of Figure
1 as σva. We also adopt the GTAP factor transformation elasticities, which imply that
labour and capital are perfectly mobile factors. Land and natural resources are specific
factors used only in the production of primary agricultural commodities and primary
energy commodities, respectively.
For each region private and public demand derives from the maximization of a CES
function of an aggregate ‘energy’ good and an aggregate ‘non-energy’ good, with a CES
substitution elasticity σ = 0.5. The ‘energy’ aggregate is a Cobb-Douglas function
of energy goods (coal, oil, gas, petrol, electricity, gas distribution), while the ‘non-
energy’ aggregate is a Cobb-Douglas function of the remaining commodities. In all
regions, each agent’s endowment of primary factors of production is assumed to be
2See Burnieaux and Truong (2002), Rutherford and Paltsev (2000) or Fischer and Fox (2007), among
many others for a more detailed description of the structure of production and consumption.
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energy
σ = 0
σva
capital
value added
non-energy inputs oil
labour specific factors
σvae = 0.5
σe = 0.1
electricity
production of i
non-electric
σlqd = 2
coal liquid fuel
petrol
σnel = 0.5
gas
Figure 1: Structure of Production
fixed. These primary factors are all supplied to the production sectors in each region,
and factors are assumed always to be fully employed. For the aggregated regions of
sanction countries ‘SAN’ and the rest of the world ‘RoW’, real aggregate public demand
is fixed. A single representative agent owns all primary factors of production, and all
tax revenue is assumed to be costlessly collected and redistributed to this representative
consumer.
But many features of the international sanctions applied to trade with Iran and of the
Iranian economy in general make it inappropriate to adopt such a structure for private
and public demand and factor ownership in Iran. We need to model the distribution of
the ownership of factors of production in Iran to reflect the reality of factor ownership
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in Iran. As such, we assume that the government owns all Natural Resources, and earns
all rents generated by capital employed in the energy sectors in Iran. Private consumers
earn all income generated from the use of Land and Labour, and also earn all income
from capital usage, except for capital used in the energy sectors. This reflects the reality
in Iran where the government earns all income from value added except labour in energy
sectors. In Iran, all tax revenue accrues to the government. Government revenue is used
to fund (exogenous) investment and to purchase services, primarily education, health
care and defense.
It is common to close the public and external sectors in CGE models by assuming that
aggregate public demand and the capital account are both exogenous. We do assume
that aggregate government spending in the ‘SAN’ and ‘RoW’ regions is exogenous. But
since international sanctions should result in such large negative changes in real govern-
ment revenue in Iran, it would be inappropriate to make aggregate government spending
exogenous. Likewise, since international sanctions will have such a strong negative effect
on Iranian trade, it would be inappropriate to make Iran’s capital account exogenous,
since in equilibrium, the current and capital accounts for any country/region must sum
to zero. While it is uncommon to have an endogenously determined capital account
balance, it is appropriate here since financial sanctions have also limited Iran’s access to
international capital markets. For clarity, we assume that Iran’s capital account balance
moves in fixed proportion with aggregate government spending, so international sanc-
tions will cause an equi-proportionate reduction in real government spending (revenue)
and the current (capital) account balance. Of course, we must also make the trade and
capital account balance endogenous in the ‘SAN’ and ‘RoW’ regions, so we assume that
the current/capital accounts there move in proportion with each region’s real income.
Iran is a small trading partner with ‘SAN’ and ‘RoW’, so it makes intuitive sense that
international sanctions will have only a small effect on the trade and capital account
balances in ‘SAN’ and ‘RoW’.
We are also interested in the distributional consequences of the application of inter-
national sanctions in Iran, since it is often argued that sanctions impose a significant
burden on private consumers and can disproportionately affect low-income or disad-
vantaged consumers. As such, it is necessary to disaggregate private consumption in
Iran. To capture the disparate effects of international sanctions on low and high income
consumers, and to reflect the fact that sanctions could have different effects on urban
versus rural consumers, we disaggregate private consumption in Iran into ten rural and
ten urban consumption groups by income decile. This requires us to disaggregate both
11
private income and expenditure for Iran in the GTAP8 dataset. To disaggregate private
expenditure, we use the Income and Expenditure Survey published by the Statistical
Centre of Iran (2005) to calculate expenditure shares θi,h,n at different income deciles
n ∈ (1, 2, . . . , 10) of households h ∈ (urban, rural) which are consistent with the 18
aggregated commodities i. These shares are reported in Tables A1 and A2 of Gharib-
navaz and Waschik (2014). We also use the SCI Income and Expenditure Survey to
disaggregate income by household. The Survey includes information on all wages and
salaries obtained from self-employment in agricultural and non-agricultural activities,
private and public sector employment, and other income during the reference period.
As noted earlier, all natural resource rents accrue to the government in Iran, as does
income earned by capital employed in energy sectors. Remaining income in the GTAP8
dataset is allocated to disaggregated urban and rural households using shares reported
in Table A3 of Gharibnavaz and Waschik (2014), where income categories in the SCI
Income and Expenditure Survey are matched to GTAP8 factors. After disaggregating
household income by source and household expenditure by commodity, the income equals
expenditure constraint for each household will no longer be satisfied, because the ac-
counting disaggregation does not take account of savings. Data on savings by households
is not available from the Iranian Statistical Centre. To rebalance household accounts,
we assign that share of aggregate savings to each household so that their income equals
expenditure constraint is satisfied. Since the initial dataset is balanced, assigning the
remaining savings to the government will then balance the government account. Private
and government savings is assumed to be exogenous throughout. Allocating savings
between households and the government in this way leaves the government in Iran with
an 80% share of aggregate savings in the benchmark equilibrium.
As is common in CGE models, we follow Armington (1969) and incorporate imports
into the model by treating domestic and imported varieties of the same good as differ-
entiated products by domestic users of those goods. Intermediate inputs in production
and inputs into private and public consumption are assumed to be CES aggregates of
domestically produced goods and their imported counterparts. We adopt the Arming-
ton substitution elasticities σidm from the GTAP8 dataset, available from Narayanan
et al. (2012), and assume that the substitution elasticity between imports of good i from
different regions is given by σimm = 2 · σ
i
dm. There are a number of distortions in the
GTAP8 dataset reflected by ad valorem taxes on private and public consumption, usage
of intermediate inputs by firms, production of outputs and trade. The CGE model is
solved using MPSGE in GAMS.
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4 Counterfactual Results
The effects of international sanctions on trade with Iran are simulated using the CGE
data and model described in Section 3 by generating a counterfactual general equilibrium
in which trade between sanction countries in the aggregated region ‘SAN’ and Iran is
reduced consistent with the description of international sanctions in Section 2. The
desired reductions in sanction country imports from Iran are achieved by introducing
an endogenous tax on sanction country imports of oil, petroleum products and metals
from Iran. We also introduce an endogenous tax on ‘SAN’ exports to Iran of sanctioned
commodities, to reflect sanctions on exports of petroleum products, metals and motor
vehicles from ‘SAN’ to Iran. These endogenous taxes adjust until ‘SAN’ trade with Iran
of sanctioned commodities falls to 1−k of its level in the initial benchmark equilibrium.
This allows us to illustrate successive tightening of sanctions on ‘SAN’ exports to Iran
and ‘SAN’ imports from Iran by increasing k ∈ (0, 1).
The effects of sanctions imposed by ‘SAN’ on trade with Iran are reported in Table
3 for successive tightening of sanctions from k = 0.25 of benchmark trade in sanctioned
commodities to k = 0.75. The data on Iranian oil exports reported earlier in Table 1
suggest that sanctions resulted in a reduction in Iranian oil exports of 54.0% from 2007
to 2013. While most countries/regions in the aggregate ‘SAN’ region reduced oil imports
from Iran dramatically by the end of 2013, there were many ’SAN’ countries (including
China, India, Japan, Korea and Turkey) which still imported significant quantities of
oil from Iran. For example, China accounted for over 21% of benchmark Iranian oil
exports,3 and Katzman (August 2014, p.38) suggests that from 2011-2013, Chinese oil
imports from Iran fell by only 20-25%. In the counterfactual equilibrium for k = 0.75
(so that ‘SAN’ exports to Iran and imports from Iran of sanctioned commodities fall
by 75%), total Iranian oil exports by volume fall by 54.8%, so we choose k = 0.75 as
representative of the level of sanctions that simulates changes in Iranian oil exports
which are broadly consistent with those actually observed.4
Table 3 shows that the sanctions had only a very small negative effect on welfare in
3Benchmark country/region trade shares for the disaggregated GTAP8 dataset for all sanctioned
Iranian exports and imports are available from the authors on request/reported in the Appendix in
Table A-2 for countries/regions with trade shares greater than 1.0%.
4The default GTAP8 Armington elasticity which governs the substitutability between domestic and
imported oil is 5.2. When we adopt this value, the ‘RoW’ region responds to international sanctions
of 75% of benchmark trade between Iran and ‘SAN’ with such a large increase in imports of Iranian
oil that total Iranian oil exports fall by only 39.8%. This response in ‘RoW’ imports of Iranian oil is
inconsistent with the data reported in Table 1, so to generate oil trade and production changes which
are consistent with those actually observed, we adopt an Armington elasticity for oil of 3.5. Specifically,
we set σoil
dm
= 3.5 and σoil
mm
= 7.0.
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Welfare k=0.25 k=0.50 k=0.75
urban1 −2.47 −4.00 −5.34
urban2 −0.99 −1.51 −2.02
urban3 −0.71 −1.04 −1.39
urban4 −0.43 −0.57 −0.79
urban5 −0.13 −0.06 −0.11
urban6 −0.19 −0.18 −0.28
urban7 0.12 0.34 0.41
urban8 −0.05 0.05 0.02
urban9 0.07 0.24 0.25
urban10 −0.09 −0.04 −0.12
rural1 −4.42 −7.21 −9.63
rural2 −1.91 −2.98 −4.04
rural3 −0.86 −1.25 −1.76
rural4 −0.10 0.06 −0.01
rural5 0.25 0.65 0.78
rural6 0.54 1.14 1.44
rural7 1.13 2.13 2.74
rural8 1.20 2.25 2.91
rural9 1.38 2.53 3.27
rural10 1.42 2.52 3.23
govt −22.74 −35.05 −42.65
Iran −7.45 −11.49 −14.13
San −0.01 −0.06 −0.15
RoW 0.15 0.31 0.49
Table 3: Welfare Effects of International Sanctions (%∆)
region ‘SAN’ which imposes sanctions. For a level of sanctions of k = 0.75, ‘SAN’ welfare
falls by 0.15%, but the ‘RoW’ region which does not impose sanctions sees a welfare
improvement of 0.49% of benchmark welfare.5 This result obtains because the ‘RoW’
region includes large oil exporters, so the ‘RoW’ region benefits from an improvement in
terms of trade as the international sanctions result in an increase in world oil prices. But
aggregate welfare in Iran falls by over 14%. The largest share of this change in welfare is
accounted for by changes in government activity in Iran, which sees real revenue fall by
over 42%. This is due primarily to a decrease in rents earned from government-owned
factors employed in oil production. For example, real rents earned by natural resources
in Iran (almost all of which are derived from ownership of natural resources specific to
the oil sector) fall by almost 70%.
5Welfare effects are the percentage change in Hicksian equivalent variations, except for the govern-
ment sector in Iran where they are changes in real aggregate government revenue, and for Iran where
they are a weighted average of welfare changes for households and real aggregate government revenue.
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While the government in Iran bears the largest share of the effects of international
sanctions, the lowest-income rural and urban households also fare poorly, experiencing
a 9.6% and 5.3% welfare loss, respectively. But sanctions cause resources to move out of
oil production and into production of agricultural commodities, so the real return to land
increases. Since land is mostly owned by rural households and since higher income rural
households own more land, medium- and high-income rural households actually see an
increase in welfare after the imposition of international sanctions. Finally, international
sanctions are focused on highly capital-intensive energy and metals sectors, so the real
return to capital in Iran falls while the real return to labour rises, and the wage-rent
ratio increases by almost 11%. Since rural households derive relatively more income
from the ownership of labour than urban households who earn relatively more income
from capital, international sanctions cause larger welfare gains in rural households than
urban households for all but the three lowest-income deciles.
In the counterfactual where the level of international sanctions is set at 75%, the trade
results are roughly consistent with those reported in Table 1. But in this counterfactual,
the production of oil in Iran falls by 19.5%, while the production data reported in Table
1 suggest that Iranian oil production fell by only 11.3% over the period 2007-2013.
As noted in Section 2, there is evidence that the Iranian government purchased and
stockpiled oil from Iranian production facilities in response to international sanctions
on exports of Iranian oil. Results in Table 3 presume that no oil was stockpiled by the
Iranian government. To show the effects of oil stockpiling, we re-run the counterfactual
simulations with the level of sanctions k = 0.75, assuming that the Iranian government
stockpiles a share s of the oil which would otherwise have been purchased by sanction
countries. But it is difficult to find evidence on the volume of oil stockpiled by the Iranian
government. As noted earlier, International Energy Agency (2013) estimates that Iran
has total (floating plus onshore) storage capacity of around 45 million barrels. Of course,
this oil will not be stockpiled indefinitely, and there is evidence (see The Economist (30
March 2013) and Luers et al. (2012, p.37-8), for example) that Iran has the ability to
sell stockpiled oil on the black market. Iran can also sell its stockpiled oil to a non-EU
country where the Iranian oil can be refined or blended and even ultimately re-exported
to the EU, a practice that was consistent with EU sanctions (Van de Graaf (2013,
p.152)). If Iran can turn over its stockpiled oil five times per year, that is approximately
equivalent to 20% of the oil which would have been purchased by sanction countries,6 so
6In the benchmark equilibrium, ‘SAN’ accounts for 98.6% of Iran’s oil exports, so 20% of the reduc-
tion in ‘SAN’ oil imports over year 2007 production with k = 0.75 is 4.0307 ·365 ·0.986 ·0.75 ·0.20≈ 218
million barrels per year, approximately equal to five times Iran’s storage capacity of 45 million barrels.
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s=0.0 s=0.10 s=0.20 s=0.30
urban1 −5.34 −5.58 −5.86 −6.16
urban2 −2.02 −2.28 −2.57 −2.88
urban3 −1.39 −1.68 −2.00 −2.34
urban4 −0.79 −1.12 −1.47 −1.85
urban5 −0.11 −0.45 −0.81 −1.20
urban6 −0.28 −0.61 −0.96 −1.34
urban7 0.41 0.06 −0.31 −0.72
urban8 0.02 −0.31 −0.67 −1.05
urban9 0.25 −0.05 −0.38 −0.74
urban10 −0.12 −0.37 −0.65 −0.95
rural1 −9.63 −10.02 −10.44 −10.90
rural2 −4.04 −4.59 −5.17 −5.80
rural3 −1.76 −2.30 −2.88 −3.50
rural4 −0.01 −0.61 −1.25 −1.93
rural5 0.78 0.15 −0.53 −1.25
rural6 1.44 0.81 0.14 −0.58
rural7 2.74 2.08 1.38 0.63
rural8 2.91 2.26 1.59 0.86
rural9 3.27 2.65 1.99 1.29
rural10 3.23 2.75 2.25 1.70
govt −42.65 −45.82 −49.16 −52.50
Iran −14.13 −15.51 −16.92 −18.36
San −0.15 −0.15 −0.16 −0.17
RoW 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52
stock g 7.47 14.79 22.11
stock y 2.53 5.01 7.49
Table 4: Welfare Effects with Iranian Government Oil Stockpiling (%∆)
to reflect stockpiling of oil by the government of Iran, we run simulations for s = 0, 0.10,
0.20 and 0.30. We include an endogenous subsidy on government oil purchases which
adjusts to the point where the government purchases/stockpiles s · k of the initial oil
imports by ‘SAN’ countries. More stockpiling requires larger government purchases of
oil, which require larger values for the endogenous subsidy. Since all tax revenue accrues
to the government in Iran, this endogenous subsidy is a direct cost to the government
for stockpiling oil.
The welfare effects with stockpiling of oil by the Iranian government are reported in
Table 4, where the first column (s = 0) corresponds to the last column in Table 3. As
we would expect, oil stockpiling by the Iranian government has only the smallest effect
on regions ‘SAN’ and ‘RoW’. But as oil stockpiling increases from 0-30% of benchmark
oil imports by sanction countries, the decrease in aggregate welfare in Iran worsens
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from just over 14% to almost 18.4%. All households in Iran see larger welfare losses
or smaller welfare gains as the government stockpiles oil in response to international
sanctions. Since stockpiling of oil results in smaller reductions in oil production, the shift
in the Iranian economy away from energy production is smaller, and the increase in the
wage/rent ratio is smaller (9.0% when s = 0.20, compared to 11% when s = 0.0), as is the
real return to land (21% when s = 0.20 compared to over 23% when s = 0.0). But again,
the largest share of Iran’s welfare loss due to stockpiling is borne by the government in
Iran, as the decrease in real government revenue in Iran worsens from over 42% with
no stockpiling (s = 0) to almost 50% with s = 0.20. Since the Iranian government is
effectively protecting its oil sector by subsidizing oil consumption to stockpile oil, the
price of oil in Iran does not fall by as much as when there is no stockpiling, and real rents
earned from natural resources in oil production do not fall as far as they do without
stockpiling. But this gain to government revenue (relative to the counterfactual where
there is no stockpiling) is much more than offset by the cost of the subsidy to pay for
the stockpiling of oil. For example, with s = 0.20, real natural resource rents fall by
$US18.5 billion compared to their level in the benchmark, while they drop by almost
$US20.8 billion with no stockpiling. But the cost of the subsidy to stockpile oil is just
over $US7.4 billion when s = 0.20, so real government revenue falls by considerably
more when the Iranian government stockpiles oil.
The welfare changes reported in Table 4 take no account of the value of stockpiled
oil which the Iranian government accumulates. While we presume that the Iranian
government has the ability to sell its stockpiled oil on the black market, it is not clear
which price should be used to value this stockpiled oil. For example, Van de Graaf (2013,
p.152) argues that sanctions will enable Asian nations (especially China, India, Japan
and South Korea) to “extract discounts” on the oil which they do purchase from Iran.
To address this issue we report the value of the Iranian government’s oil stockpile at
the bottom of Table 4, expressed as a share of benchmark government revenue (stock g)
and as a share of benchmark national income in Iran (stock y). These values are derived
using the price of oil in the RoW region, and as such they represent an upper-bound
on the value of Iran’s stockpiled oil if it can all be sold at no discount at prevailing
world prices. For example, if Iran must accept a 50% discount to sell its stockpiled oil,
then when s = 0.20, the government of Iran would recover 14.79 · 0.50 = 7.40% of its
lost revenue, so government revenue in Iran would fall by −49.16 + 7.40 = −41.77%,
compared to the drop in welfare of 42.65% when no oil is stockpiled. The aggregate
welfare loss in Iran would be −16.92+(5.01 ·0.50) = −14.42% when s = 0.20, compared
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to -14.13% when no oil is stockpiled.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
Since international sanctions are focused directly on Iranian exports and imports, the
effects of international sanctions will be strongly affected by the central case values
for the Armington elasticities. To illustrate, we focus on the counterfactual where the
level of international sanctions is set at k = 0.75 and the level of Iranian government
stockpiling of oil is set at s = 0.20. We reset the value of the Armington elasticity to
0.75 · σgtap8dm and 1.5 · σ
gtap8
dm , where σ
gtap8
dm is our central case value for the Armington
elasticity which we adopted from the GTAP8 dataset. In each case, after resetting the
Armington elasticity, we reset the substitution elasticity between imports from different
regions to σmm = 2 · σdm.
Table 5 shows that changes to the specification of the Armington elasticity have very
little effect on welfare in the ‘SAN’ and ‘RoW’ regions. But increasing (decreasing)
the Armington elasticity improves (worsens) the welfare for all economic agents in Iran.
Changes in the Armington elasticity will have little effect on trade between Iran and
‘SAN’ countries since so much of this trade is controlled by sanctions. But cet. par.,
higher Armington elasticities will increase trade flows between Iran and the ‘RoW’ re-
gion. As a result, damage to the Iranian economy due to the strong negative effect of
international sanctions on Iran’s trade balance and its terms of trade will be mitigated
when the Armington elasticity is increased.
The final example we use to illustrate sensitivity of welfare results considers the
mobility of capital in oil production. Oil production costs in Iran are due almost entirely
to capital costs and rents accruing to natural resources. Intermediate inputs and labour
account for slightly less than 3% and 1%, respectively, of the cost of producing of oil in
Iran in the benchmark. Capital costs account for just over two-thirds of oil production
costs, while the remaining 28% of production costs accrue to natural resources. As
noted earlier, capital and natural resources in oil production in Iran are all owned by
the government, but while natural resources are modelled as a specific factor, capital is
treated as perfectly mobile. As a result of international sanctions, there is a large drop
in rents earned by natural resources. But since capital is modelled as being perfectly
mobile, large amounts of capital leave the oil sector. As a result, the decrease in the real
return to capital (-3.0% when k = 0.75 and s = 0.20) is much smaller than the decrease
in the real return to natural resources (-61.7%).
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k = 0.75 s = 0.20
0.75 · σgtap8dm σ
gtap8
dm 1.5 · σ
gtap8
dm
urban1 −10.38 −5.86 −2.35
urban2 −5.51 −2.57 −0.37
urban3 −4.84 −2.00 0.07
urban4 −4.29 −1.47 0.55
urban5 −3.37 −0.81 0.97
urban6 −3.57 −0.96 0.88
urban7 −2.74 −0.31 1.34
urban8 −3.18 −0.67 1.08
urban9 −2.62 −0.38 1.18
urban10 −2.71 −0.65 0.82
rural1 −18.31 −10.44 −4.41
rural2 −11.48 −5.17 −0.60
rural3 −8.05 −2.88 0.80
rural4 −5.95 −1.25 1.98
rural5 −5.08 −0.53 2.53
rural6 −4.05 0.14 2.91
rural7 −2.39 1.38 3.80
rural8 −1.94 1.59 3.82
rural9 −1.21 1.99 4.00
rural10 0.02 2.25 3.66
govt −52.39 −49.16 −45.78
Iran −19.78 −16.92 −14.52
San −0.16 −0.16 −0.16
RoW 0.55 0.51 0.48
stock g 15.05 14.79 14.59
stock y 5.10 5.01 4.94
Table 5: Sensitivity of Welfare Effects to Armington Elasticity σdm (%∆)
But it is arguable that at least some of the capital used in oil production is more
appropriately modelled as a specific factor, since it will have little or no productive
value in other sectors. Since such a large share of value-added in oil production (and of
government revenue in Iran) is accounted for by capital in oil production, it is important
to illustrate how results depend upon the treatment of capital in the oil sector. For
example, if we treat 20% of the capital which is initially used in oil production in Iran
as a specific factor, then this capital will not be able to flee the oil sector when the
introduction of international sanctions causes a large decrease in oil production in Iran.
The ensuing drop in the real return to mobile capital should be much smaller, and more
of the costs of the international sanctions will be borne by the immobile and specific
capital in the oil sector. More importantly, since such a large share of government
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s=0.0 s=0.20
all 20% all 20%
mobile specific mobile specific
capital capital capital capital
urban1 −5.34 −2.16 −5.86 −3.22
urban2 −2.02 0.22 −2.57 −0.70
urban3 −1.39 0.72 −2.00 −0.22
urban4 −0.79 1.39 −1.47 0.37
urban5 −0.11 1.87 −0.81 0.86
urban6 −0.28 1.82 −0.96 0.81
urban7 0.41 2.38 −0.31 1.36
urban8 0.02 2.08 −0.67 1.08
urban9 0.25 2.28 −0.38 1.33
urban10 −0.12 1.88 −0.65 1.04
rural1 −9.63 −5.38 −10.44 −6.90
rural2 −4.04 −0.97 −5.17 −2.58
rural3 −1.76 0.94 −2.88 −0.59
rural4 −0.01 2.15 −1.25 0.60
rural5 0.78 2.80 −0.53 1.22
rural6 1.44 3.27 0.14 1.73
rural7 2.74 4.31 1.38 2.76
rural8 2.91 4.37 1.59 2.88
rural9 3.27 4.76 1.99 3.31
rural10 3.23 4.82 2.25 3.63
govt −42.65 −48.51 −49.16 −54.02
Iran −14.13 −14.90 −16.92 −17.53
San −0.15 −0.14 −0.16 −0.15
RoW 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.50
stock g 14.79 14.66
stock y 5.01 4.96
Table 6: Welfare Effects with Specific Capital in Oil Production (%∆)
revenue depends upon rents from capital used in oil production, the share of the burden
of international sanctions borne by the government in Iran will increase, and that borne
by households in Iran will fall.
To demonstrate these concerns over the modelling of capital used in oil production
in Iran, we re-run the counterfactual where sanctions are set at k = 0.75 for central case
values of all other exogenously specified parameters (including Armington elasticities)
after assuming that 20% of the capital used in oil production in Iran is a specific factor.
Table 6 shows how welfare changes are affected by specification of capital mobility in the
oil sector in Iran. When some capital in oil production is modelled as a specific factor,
all households are better off, the government in Iran is worse off, and overall welfare in
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%∆ in oil %∆ in oil
production exports
no specific capital −15.6 −59.3
20% specific capital −10.7 −54.7
changes from Table 1 −11.3 −54.0
Table 7: Change in oil production and export with k=0.75, s=0.20
Iran worsens slightly, compared to the case where all capital is perfectly mobile. With
less capital leaving the oil sector due to the imposition of international sanctions, the
decrease in the real return to mobile capital is smaller. For example, with k = 0.75
and s = 0.20, the real return to mobile capital falls by only 0.5% when 20% of capital
in oil production is specific, while it falls by 3.0% when all capital is perfectly mobile.
While the increase in the real return to labour is also smaller when some capital in
oil production is specific (5.0% with 20% specific capital versus 5.7% with all mobile
capital), the gain in the real return to capital is much larger than the loss in the real
return to labour, so households are all better off, to the point where all but the three
lowest-income rural and urban household groups experience welfare increases when 20%
of the capital initially used in oil production is modelled as being a specific factor.
With more specific factors in oil production, the elasticity of supply of oil is smaller,
so for a given level of international sanctions and government stockpiling of oil, the drop
in Iranian oil production is smaller. As shown in Table 7, with k = 0.75 and s = 0.20,
the counterfactual changes in oil production and oil exports match the actual changes
over the period 2007-13 from OPEC statistics reported in Table 1 much more closely
when 20% of capital in oil production is specific. The real return to the factors which
are specific to oil production (natural resources and 20% of the capital used to produce
oil in the benchmark) falls by less (55.5% when k = 0.75 and s = 0.20) than when
all capital is perfectly mobile (61.7% when k = 0.75 and s = 0.20). But total real
government revenue from 20% of the capital used in oil production is so much lower
when this capital is specific that real government revenue in Iran falls by considerably
more when this capital used in oil production is modelled as a specific factor.
6 Conclusion
After protracted negotiations which began in November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (the
five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) signed the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna on 14 July 2015. Contingent upon
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a positive report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has
complied with the terms of the JCPOA and that all outstanding issues between Iran
and the IAEA have been resolved, the JCPOA calls for the lifting of economic sanctions
which had been imposed by the US, the EU and other countries on Iran’s economy
in an attempt to discourage the government of Iran from continuing to engage in the
development of a nuclear weapons capability. In this paper we analyzed the welfare
impact of these comprehensive economic sanctions on Iran’s economy. We incorporated
endogenous taxes into a global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to sim-
ulate the effects of these sanctions and the stockpiling of oil by the Iranian government.
The GTAP8 dataset was augmented with information from the Statistical Centre of
Iran (SCI) to disaggregate private and public consumption and income in Iran between
the government in Iran and 10 rural and 10 urban household groups to highlight the
welfare effects of sanctions not only on the Iranian economy in general but also on urban
and rural households disaggregated by income level. We also adopted a non-standard
closure by endogenizing the aggregate public and external sectors in Iran, so that the
CGE model would more realistically simulate the effects of sanctions, since the primary
target of international sanctions was the behaviour of the government of Iran.
While results suggest international sanctions caused a decrease in aggregate welfare in
Iran of 14-15%, these welfare costs were very unevenly distributed through the Iranian
economy. The lowest-income urban and rural households fared poorly, seeing welfare
losses of 5% and 10%, respectively, while the sanctions had much more limited effects
on middle- and upper-income households, with the four highest-income rural household
deciles experiencing a welfare increase of 2-3%. But the government in Iran has borne
the largest share of the effects of international sanctions, with real government revenue
falling by 40-50%. Results also suggest that oil stockpiling by the Iranian government
left all urban and rural households worse off, though it gave the government the ability to
mitigate some of its welfare losses. Since international sanctions directly target Iranian
exports and imports, results are sensitive to specification of Armington/trade elasticities.
Higher trade elasticities dampen the negative terms of trade effects which sanctions exert
on the Iranian economy and their negative effect on Iran’s trade balance. Furthermore,
modelling some of the capital used in oil production in Iran as a specific factor increases
the burden of international sanctions which is borne by the government in Iran and
improves the welfare of all households relative to the case where all capital is perfectly
mobile.
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Appendix - not to be published
Sector GTAP8 Sectors (sector code)
Wheat Wheat (wht), Cereal Grains (gro), Plant-based Fibers (pbf)
Milk Milk (rmk)
Meat Cattle, Sheep, Goats, Horses (ctl), Fishing (fsh), Cattle, Sheep,
Goats, Horse (cmt), Meat Products (omt)
Vegetable oil Oil Seed (osd), Vegetable Oils and Fats (vol)
Dairy products Animal Products (oap), Dairy Products (mil)
Sugar Sugar (sgr)
Primary agricultural
products
Paddy Rice (pdr), Vegetables, Fruits and Nuts (v f), Sugar cane
and Sugar beet (c b), Crops (ocr), Wool, Silk-worm Cocoons
(wol)
Processed agricultural
products
Processed Rice (pcr), Food Products (ofd), Beverages and To-
bacco Products (b t)
Coal Coal (coa)
Oilx Oil (oil)
Gas Gas (gas), Gas manufacture, distribution (gdt)
Electricity Electricity (ely)
Petroleum productsx,m Petroleum and Coal Products (p c)
Metalsx,m Chemical, rubber, plastic prods (crp), Mineral products n.e.c.
(nmm), Ferrous metals (i s), Metals n.e.c. (nfm), Metal products
(fmp)
Motor Vehiclesm Motor vehicles and parts (mvh)
Manufactures Forestry (frs), Minerals n.e.c. (omn), Textiles (tex), Wearing
apparel (wap), Leather products (lea), Wood products (lum),
Paper products, Publishing (ppp), Transport equipment n.e.c.
(otn), Electronic equipment (ele), Machinery and equipment
n.e.c. (ome), Manufactures n.e.c. (omf)
Transport services Transport n.e.c. (otp), Sea Transport (wtp), Air Transport (atp)
Services Water (wtr), Construction (cns), Trade (trd), Communication
(cmn), Financial services n.e.c. (ofi), Insurance (isr), Business
services n.e.c. (obs), Recreation and other services (ros), Pub-
Admin/Defence/Health/Educat (osg), Dwellings (dwe)
Table A-1: Sectors in Aggregated GTAP8 Data Base
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Iran Exports to Iran Imports from
oil p c met p c met mvh
sChina 21.33 41.14 9.94 4.71 16.80 22.45
sJapan 25.99 9.77 2.18 2.12 7.35
sKorea Republic of 9.06 2.49 7.75 13.71
sTaiwan 20.56 3.19 3.33 1.63
sMalaysia 1.20
sSingapore 1.05 6.80 2.71
Thailand 1.23
sIndia 7.12 8.96 24.41 3.10 1.01
Pakistan 2.61
Rest of South Asia 2.89
sUnited States of America 1.02
Argentina 1.13
Brazil 1.57
sBelgium 2.47 1.43
sFrance 9.91 2.07 3.66 19.25
sGermany 1.71 8.50 8.82
sItaly 12.12 7.07 3.54 3.23
sNetherlands 1.73
sSpain 2.50 1.29 2.99
sSweden 1.12
sUnited Kingdom 2.17 1.24
sSwitzerland 2.41
sRomania 1.61
Russian Federation 12.65
Ukraine 1.72
Kazakhstan 2.78 4.67
Rest of Former Soviet Union 1.98 3.57
Armenia 1.40 1.38
Azerbaijan 1.34 12.42
Kuwait 3.47
Qatar 1.24
Saudi Arabia 6.29 1.63
sTurkey 1.33 5.49 3.29 2.62
United Arab Emirates 3.64 9.17 40.75 9.83 5.23
Rest of Western Asia 1.44 9.47
Egypt 1.16
Ethiopia 1.63
sSouth Africa 5.19
Countries which are members of the ‘SAN’ region are preceded with an s
superscript.
Table A-2: Benchmark GTAP8 Country/Region Trade Shares with Iran
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